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Abstract 
Misallocation of factors of production has been recently viewed as a promising 
explanation accounting for the large difference in total factor productivity (TFP) 
across countries. This paper differs from previous studies by concentrating on 
interregional capital misallocation and by focusing on the role of fiscal 
decentralization in shaping misallocation. Using a city-level panel data set, we 
measure intra-provincial and inter-municipal capital misallocation in China over 
2003-18. The empirical results based on provincial-level panel data suggest that 
fiscal decentralization can lower inter-municipal capital misallocation while 
revenue decentralization performs better than expenditure decentralization. We 
further find that this positive effect is more significant and much larger when the 
market rather than government intervention is driving the flow of capital. The 
results are robust to subsample regressions, IV estimations, spatial autoregressions 
and alternative measurement of interregional misallocation. Our study 
complements the literature on the causes of misallocation and enriches the 
understanding of the consequences of fiscal decentralization, especially in terms of 
economic growth and interregional inequality. 
Keywords: fiscal decentralization, interregional misallocation, China 
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Misallocation has been viewed as a promising explanation accounting for the large TFP (total 
factor productivity) differences across countries (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008). The essence of 
this insight is that when resources are misallocated, the marginal products of capital or labor will 
disperse across producers, and therefore the economy will operate inside its production 
possibilities frontier, with the result that a given quantity of inputs produces less total output 
(Jones, 2016).  
This paper explores the source of one dimension of misallocation, that is, interregional capital 
misallocation by focusing on the potential role played by fiscal decentralization in the context of 
China. The motivation is that fiscal decentralization may be naturally linked to interregional 
factor (mis)allocation, as the essence of fiscal decentralization is a process of devolution of 
fiscal, and other economic and political powers from a larger jurisdiction—the central 
government—to several smaller jurisdictions administrated by subnational governments. As a 
result, decentralization endows subnational governments with significant power and capacity to 
allocate resources. For example, in the Chinese context, the share of subnational government 
expenditures reaches over 80 percent of the consolidated public sector. 
In this paper, we first document the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
(interregional) misallocation. The theoretical analysis suggests that the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on interregional misallocation is ambiguous. Next, we measure intra-provincial 
and inter-municipal capital misallocation based on city-level data for China over the period 
2003-18. Our empirical results show that fiscal decentralization can lower interregional capital 
misallocation, while revenue decentralization performs better than expenditure decentralization. 




misallocation are significantly stronger when it is market forces rather than government 
intervention that is driving the flow of capital. Our results are robust to different specifications, 
IV estimation, alternative measurement of interregional misallocation and spatial econometric 
estimations. 
Our study is closely related to two threads of the literature. First, this paper contributes to the 
literature on misallocation. Restuccia and Rogerson (2017) divide this literature into two 
categories according to the different approaches they adopt, that is, the direct approach and the 
indirect approach. The former concentrates on measuring misallocation, attempting to investigate 
to what extent misallocation affects TFP without considering the source of misallocation. One 
important and representative paper is Hsieh and Klenow (2009), who measure misallocation with 
the variance of TFPR, while TFPR is proportional to the geometric average of the marginal 
products of capital and labor. Based on micro data on manufacturing firms, Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009) find that TFP in China and India would increase by 30-50 percent and 40-60 percent, 
respectively, if their resources were reallocated to the U.S. level.  
A series of papers extended this approach to other countries and other sectors, including Busso et 
al. (2013) for 10 Latin American countries, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sorensen (2016) for 10 African 
countries, De Vries (2014) for the retail sector in Brazil, and Brandt et al. (2013) for non-
agricultural sector in China. In addition, there are some studies aiming to improve the 
measurement methodology to overcome the potential measurement error and adjustment cost 
problem (Song and Wu, 2015; Bils et al., 2017). The second category of papers in this literature, 
labeled as using the direct approach, focuses on the causes of misallocation and documents a 




and Xu, 2014; Moll, 2014), imperfect information (David et al., 2016) and government 
regulation (Hsieh and Moretti, 2015; Fajelbaum et al., 2015).  
This paper differs from and contributes to the previous literature on misallocation in the 
following two aspects. First, given that the majority of studies presented above are focused on 
the misuse of resources among firms, we are interested in interregional capital misallocation, 
specifically, measuring inter-municipal capital misallocation in China. The only two previous 
papers that have adopted a regional focus, and which are further discussed below, are Brandt et 
al. (2013), who examine inter-provincial misallocation in China, and Hsieh and Moretti (2015), 
who explore labor misallocation across U.S. cities. Second, we are the first to investigate the 
potential role played by fiscal decentralization policy in shaping interregional misallocation. This 
complements the previous literature on misallocation that utilize, as Restuccia and Rogerson 
(2017) called it, the direct approach. 
Second, our work is also related to literature on fiscal federalism, especially to those papers that 
empirically examine the social and economic impact of fiscal decentralization. Example of topics 
that have been carefully examined include the impact of fiscal decentralization on public goods 
and service provision (e.g., Faguet and Sanchez, 2014; Falch and Fischer, 2012), interregional 
disparities (e.g., Lessmann, 2009; Kyriacou et al., 2015), government size and corruption (e.g., 
Marlow, 1988; Jin and Zhou, 2002; Fisman and Gatti, 2002) and, most importantly, economic 
growth (e.g., Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Gemmell et al., 2013). See Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2017) 
for a comprehensive review of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economy, society, and 
politics. However, to our knowledge, there has been no previous research on the potential impact 




interaction of decentralization and misallocation might be a reason for the very diverse results in 
the fiscal federalism literature on the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. 
This paper fills this gap by empirically examining the effect of fiscal decentralization on the 
measured inter-municipal capital misallocation in China. Our study aims at enriching the 
understanding of the economic consequences of fiscal decentralization and shedding a light on 
the following two questions. First, to contribute to the better understanding of the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on economic growth since economic growth critically depends on the 
efficiency of resource allocation. We actually find that certain features of fiscal decentralization 
may help correct interregional capital misallocation in China helping boost the economy, which 
is consistent with the viewpoint that fiscal decentralization has served as a fundamental 
institution underlying China’s rapid economic growth (Qian and Weingast, 1997; Xu, 2011). 
Second, we contribute to the literature on the impact of fiscal decentralization on interregional 
inequality because interregional inequality can be attributed to both heterogeneity in resource 
endowments and effectiveness in their use across different regions. However, our findings 
suggest that interregional inequality in China may not be due so much to the imbalances in 
capital allocation-- since fiscal decentralization tends to mitigate interregional capital 
misallocation. Nevertheless, others have found that overall, fiscal decentralization policies have 
worsened interregional disparities in China (Liu et al., 2017). Ultimately, the reason why poor 
areas in China remain poor would appear not to be due to the lack of capital but the fact that the 
existing capital may have relative fewer complementary production factors, related to the 
provisions of public services such as the quality of human capital.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework of the 




the data, the measurement of inter-municipal misallocation, and the econometric modeling. 
Section 4 shows the main empirical results, and section 5 offers several robustness checks. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Though there is no existing literature directly exploring the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and interregional misallocation, achieving greater efficiency in the allocation of 
resources has been at the core of the fiscal federalism since its beginning. Viewing local 
governments as benevolent agents whose goal is to efficiently provide public goods and services 
within their jurisdictions, the first-generation fiscal federalism theory (FGT) contends that 
subnational governments have information advantages to provide heterogeneous levels of public 
goods when residents have heterogeneous tastes across jurisdictions (Oates, 1972). This 
mechanism is reinforced by the process of “voting with one’s feet” in Tiebout (1956) when the 
mobility of households exists. Therefore, compared with central governments which generally 
provide uniform levels of public goods and services, decentralized provision can meet diverse 
demands by providing, for example, more and better specific services in regions where residents 
value those services more than that in other jurisdictions. In this way, decentralization alleviates 
interregional misallocation of public output and results in greater allocative (consumer) 
efficiency. Extending this intuition to considering producer efficiency, subnational governments 
may also possess a superior knowledge of their production frontier. This may be especially the 
case for developing and transitional economies where governments more often directly and 
intensively intervene in the production process (Shah, 1999). A recent study by Huang et al. 
(2017) confirms this conjecture. Inspired by Hayek’s (1945) influential insight that local 




Huang et al. (2017) examine China’s experience with the decentralization of State-owned 
Enterprises (SOE). They show that when the distance between the SOE and the government is 
greater, the SOE is more likely to be decentralized. Moreover, this distance-decentralization link 
is more pronounced when communication costs are high and firm-performance heterogeneity is 
large, implying that the central government is aware of the fact that local information which is 
better controlled by subnational governments leads to producer efficiency. By this logic and 
similarity to consumer efficiency, decentralization allows local governments to take advantage of 
region-specific information and undertake different actions to better approach their production 
frontier. This, again, mitigates interregional resource misallocation. 
The FGT, however, does not fully characterize the features and functions of decentralization 
since it simply assumes local governments are benevolent agents without accounting for different 
incentives public officials may face. Those incentives are fully taken into account in the second-
generation fiscal federalism theory (SGT), which largely borrows insights not only from many 
other fields in economics but also from other disciplines especially political sciences (Qian and 
Weingast, 1997; Oates, 2005). In China’s particular context, fiscal (economic) decentralization is 
combined with political centralization, where appointments, promotions and demotions of 
subnational officials are determined by upper level governments, especially the central 
government. Therefore, national authorities can use personal control to align regional interests 
with national ones and motivate local officials to pursue the central government’s main goal, 
which, during the past decades, has been to promote economic development as measured by the 
growth rate of GDP (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011). Under this arrangement, local governments 
are encouraged to undertake a series of activities that may correct interregional resource 




supporting activities and initiate reforms to foster economic prosperity rather than service to 
particular interest groups (Weingast, 2009). For example, Jin et al. (2005) document that 
provincial decentralization in China has been associated with fast development in the non-state 
sector and reform in the state sector. Second, subnational governments tend to provide more 
“productive” goods such as transport infrastructure, which can improve efficiency by lowering 
transportation costs and also enhance geographical factor mobility (Kappeler et al., 2013). Third, 
regions compete for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to boost economic growth while 
FDI itself will flow into areas with higher marginal capital returns. Liu and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2014) offer strong evidence in favor of the existence of this type of inter-jurisdictional 
competition in China. Therefore, there are strong forces for the marginal products of capital 
across regions to be equalized and for capital misallocation to be decreased. Last but not least, 
decentralization allows and motivates governments to try economic experiments to find 
successive economic policies that are conducive to economic development. One prominent 
example in China is the Special Economic Zone or Economic Development Zone experiment, 
which was introduced originally by the governor of Guangdong province in 1979 and then 
extended to the whole nation after the experiment turned out to be successful. This policy has 
been credited with increasing FDI in China significantly and it has become a tool for local 
governments to compete for attracting firms’ investment (Liu and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014). 
According to Xu (2011), in 2005, when China became the largest FDI recipient country in the 
world, 93 percent of FDI was located in Special Economic Zones. 
Of course, the discussion above does not capture the full array of potential effects of fiscal 
decentralization on resource allocation. As a double-edged sword, decentralization has 




that there are at least two main channels through which decentralization may lead to greater 
interregional resource misallocation. First, competition among governments that drives the flow 
of capital can have some serious side effects. Especially, rich regions can offer more favorable 
conditions to attract capital, so capital will not necessarily flow to poorer areas despite the 
potential higher returns they may obtain there. In this regard, it is widely known that economic 
development in China has been unbalanced, fostering an environment that may result in poor 
regions in non-coastal areas becoming poorer due to the lack of competitive ability. Moreover, 
when the gap between rich and poor regions is large enough, the governments in poor areas, 
knowing they will lose in the promotion-driven competition, may simply give up, making 
matters worse (Cai and Treisman, 2005). Lastly, in the process of a “race to the bottom”, local 
governments may lower tax rates, environmental standards or labor standards in order to attract 
investment, which, beyond other negative consequences, may distort the flow of capital because 
firms’ costs are deliberately reduced to below the equilibrium level.  
Second, subnational governments, for their own narrow benefits, might implement regional 
protectionist policies to prevent capital from flowing out of their jurisdictions, limiting the 
formation of economies of scale and causing interregional misallocation. Specifically, so to 
attain certain economic performance goals, subnational governments may be reluctant to see 
capital outflowing because it could result in a loss in revenues and a drop in the employment 
rate. Bai et al. (2004) present evidence that local governments in China tend to protect industries 
where the past tax-plus-profit margins and the share of state ownership are high, implying that 
local governments are pursing the goal of maximizing fiscal revenues. In addition, the state-
owned financial institutions in China endow governments with considerably more power than is 




intervention in national capital market (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). Thirdly, local 
protectionism can be promoted when local politicians can extract substantial rents from local 
enterprises (Sonin, 2010). Given the anecdotal evidence documented in Chinese media 
suggesting wide corruption among local officials, it is not surprising to expect that the Chinese 
regional policymaking-system, which lacks accountability and transparency, can induce local 
officials’ rent-seeking behavior.1  
Summing up, the FGT argues that fiscal decentralization can mitigate resource misallocation 
while the SGT implications are much more nuanced, with fiscal decentralization potentially 
exerting both positive and negative effects on interregional misallocation. According to the SGT, 
when subnational governments are doing what they should do (like providing infrastructure, 
fostering markets, and playing the role of “night-watcher”)—rather than disturbing the 
functioning of markets (through local protection erecting interregional barriers, using improper 
subsidies or entering into a “race to the bottom”)—the net effect of fiscal decentralization may 
be to reduce interregional misallocation. What forces will dominate cannot be predicted a priori, 
which calls for conducting an empirical analysis of this issue to discern the final net impact. This 
is carried out in the next sections of the paper. 
3. Measuring Interregional Misallocation, Model Specification and Data 
3.1. Measuring Interregional Misallocation 
As mentioned above, most of the existing literature on measuring misallocation concentrates on 
measuring misallocation among firms and exploiting the large firm-level data sets available. 
Nonetheless, the intuition is very similar when measuring interregional misallocation. That is, 
                                               





misallocation is characterized by the dispersion of marginal products of capital or labor across 
producers (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2017). Following this insight, we propose to measure 
interregional capital misallocation by examining the variation in the marginal return of capital 
across cities within one province. In particular, we use the following formulation:2 
 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡) 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡)    ⁄  (1) 
Here 𝑖 denotes province, 𝑡 denotes year and 𝑗 denotes the city in province 𝑖; 𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the 
measured marginal products of capital at different times in city 𝑗. The numerator in (1) is the 
standard deviation of the marginal products of capital in province 𝑖 at the city level and the 
denominator is its mean value across cities. Therefore, the greater (the coefficient of variation) 
𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is, the more disperse is the marginal products of capital across cities for province 𝑖, and 
therefore the more inefficiently the capital is allocated within province 𝑖. 
It is obvious that the marginal products of capital for each city need to be calculated at first. 
Following Caselli and Feyrer (2007) and in a more simplified manner, we exploit the fact that 
𝑀𝑃𝐾 equals the rate of return to capital in the standard neo-classic model featuring a constant-
return production function and with perfect competition.3 Under these conditions, the aggregate 
                                               
2 We realize that most studies measure misallocation based on micro firm-level data. In particular, relevant studies 
on China use data from the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms, which is a census of all non-state firms with 
more than 5 million yuan in revenue plus all state-owned firms (for example, Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). However, 
using this firm-level dataset would result in some other problems. First, the dataset is not available after the year of 
2013, and actually most studies focus on the sample period before 2009 considering the quality of the data. 
Therefore, it cannot provide enough observations of inter-municipal misallocation for us to conduct panel 
regressions. Second, measuring interregional misallocation based on firm-level data can be quite complicated. In the 
context of this paper, misallocation comprises inter-municipal misallocation and misallocation within each city, but 
we focus only on the former. Furthermore, distinguishing between these two types of misallocation relies on the 
assumption that the factors of production are first allocated within the city to attain the optimal and then allocated 
across cities, which is not necessarily the case in reality. Third, this dataset covers only manufacturing firms, hence 
we cannot gain a full picture of misallocation with this dataset, especially when the share of the service sector in 
China has increased from 39% to 60% over the sample period. In fact, when it comes to measuring spatial 
misallocation, aggregate data is often employed by researchers (see Brandt et al., 2013; Hsieh and Moretti, 2019). 




𝑀𝑃𝐾 can be recovered from data on total income, the value of capital stock and the share of 
capital in total income. If 𝑌 represents GDP, 𝑠 stands for the capital share in GDP and K is the 
capital stock, then we have:4 
 𝑀𝑃𝐾 = 𝑠𝑌 𝐾⁄  (2) 
Now our task is to back out s, Y and K. Regarding Y, we can directly use data for city GDP to 
mirror total income. Some researchers have casted doubt on the accuracy of data for China’s 
GDP (e.g., Angus Maddison, 1998). However, our regression method, which exploits the 
variable variation and includes GDP as a control, allows for some mismeasurement. However, 
the capital share in total income is measured at the province level due to the lack of data 
availability at the city level. Following Bai et al. (2006), the labor share of income is calculated 
first and then we calculate s as one minus the measured labor share. The final piece of 
information we need is the capital stock K. Within the standard perpetual inventory approach, in 
order to measure capital stock, we require data on investment, the initial capital stock and the 
depreciation rate. Factoring in general data availability, we set 1990 to be the baseline year. For 
investment, we employ the data series investment in fixed assets, which is available at the city 
level and it is most frequently used by Chinese government officials to measure aggregate 
investment (Bai et al., 2006). In addition, we subtract investment in housing construction from 
the aggregate investment to get a measure of reproducible capital stock. For the depreciation rate, 
we assume it to be 10 percent, which is similar to that assumed in the recent studies (Zhang et al., 
2004; Shan, 2008).5 At last, as indicated above, we initialize the capital stock in 1990 as the ratio 
                                               
4 In Caselli and Feyrer (2007), they separate natural resources such as land from reproducible capital to correct the 
capital share and find substantial change in results. However, we simplify the measurement due to the lack of data in 
our sample. 
5 Earlier studies adopted lower rates, for example, 5 percent in Perkins (1988) and Wang and Yao (2001) and 6 





of investment in 1990 to the sum of the average growth rate of investment during 1991-95 and 
the depreciation rate. Following these steps, we then arrive at the measures of intra-provincial 
and inter-municipal capital misallocation in China for 21 provinces over 2003-18. The results are 
shown in Figure 1. Following the practice in most empirical studies based on provincial level 
panel data in China, we exclude from the calculation the four direct-controlled cities (Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing). In addition, several provinces (Hainan, Qinghai, Xizang, 
Xinjiang, Ningxia and Yunnan) are dropped because too few cities report data on investment in 
those jurisdictions. As an illustration, in the province of Xizang, only the capital city, Lasa, 
reports data on investment, so it is not possible to calculate the variance of MPK across cities and 
then compute misall with Eq. (1).  
Figure 1. Intra-provincial and inter-municipal Capital Misallocation in China 
 
Notes: The deeper the color, the greater the misallocation level. No estimation results are available for those areas in 
white.  
There are several other points worth noting in Figure 1. First, in general, the central areas in 
China exhibit the lowest misallocation level. Second, there exists spatial autocorrelation in the 
distribution of misallocation. For example, in the year of 2018, two northern provinces 
(Neimenggu and Gansu) and the coastal provinces (including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and 
Guangdong) tend to suffer from higher levels of inefficient allocation. On the other hand, 




distribution of misallocation across the country is dynamic over time. Guangxi, as an illustration, 
was one of the most inefficient provinces at the beginning of the sample period, but the ranking 
of its misallocation level decreased while its neighboring province, Guangdong, as a comparison, 
exhibits the opposite trend, with its misallocation level being lower in 2003 but then increasing 
dramatically. One tentative explanation is that after 15 years of rapid economic growth, 
Guangdong now is the most developed province with a large amount of capital stock which, 
however, is distributed quite unevenly across cities, while Guangxi province has much less 
capital stock and hence its cities are “equally” poor. This also helps explain why the developed 
coastal provinces have higher levels of interregional misallocation. However, note that the 
underdeveloped northwestern province of Gansu also exhibits a severe misallocation. For this 
latter the possible explanation is the fact that the resources are concentrated in the province’s 
capital, an usual occurrence, especially for the less-developed areas in China. 
3.2. Estimation Model 
In this section, we present the empirical strategy to determine the net effect of fiscal 
decentralization on interregional misallocation and identify the conditions under which fiscal 
decentralization exerts a significant impact. We start with the following simple regression model. 
 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
In equation (3), the index 𝑖 denotes provinces and 𝑡 denotes years; 𝜂𝑖 is province dummies to 
capture the effect of unobserved factors that are constant over time but heterogenous across 
provinces; 𝜈𝑡 represents year dummies to control for time fixed effects that may affect all 
provinces, such as the business cycle and the macroeconomic policy implemented by the central 




The dependent variable, 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡, is our measure of interregional misallocation in a province 
based on city-level data; 𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the variable of interest, the index of fiscal decentralization, so if 
𝛽 is positive and statistically significant, then we would conclude that fiscal decentralization 
increases the level of interregional misallocation. Following Liu et al. (2017), we consider both 
revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization, in turn measured as the ratio of city-
level governments’ budget revenue (expenditure) to total government revenue (expenditure) 
within a province; 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is a set of other control variables, which are selected on the basis of 
findings in previous studies on the causes of misallocation. Specifically, the following variables 
are included: 
Economic development level (lngdp): We employ the natural log of GDP per capita to measure 
the level of economic development in a province. It is a common practice to include economic 
development as a control variable when a macroeconomic variable is on the left side of the 
regression model in order to control for the general economic conditions. In addition, as can be 
seen in Figure 1, interregional misallocation tends to be higher in richer provinces, implying that 
GDP may play a role here.  
Urbanization level (urban): The ratio of urban population to total population serves as a proxy 
for the level of urbanization in a province of China. Given the large differences in the level of 
infrastructure provision, financial development, economic structure and many other prominent 
factors that can affect the allocation of capital between urban and rural areas, we can expect that 
the urbanization rate may have an impact on overall resource misallocation. 
The share of the secondary sector (secratio): Considering the large heterogeneity in the 




dividing the output in the secondary sector by regional GDP to control for the potential effects of 
economic structure.  
Finance development (finance): It is documented by a large body of literature that finance plays 
an important role in determining access to capital and hence its potential role on misallocation 
(see, for example, Midrigan and Xu, 2014; Moll, 2014). We measure the level of finance 
development by the ratio of total outstanding loans to provincial GDP. 
Trade (trade): Differences in trade protections due to tariffs, etc. can distort the allocation of 
resources across heterogeneous producers (Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Meltiz, 2003), and they 
have been found to play a significant role (Waugh, 2010; Tomebe, 2015). Besides, trade policy 
may also affect misallocation through its effect on competition (Edmond et al., 2015). In view of 
this, trade is also included as a control variable, and it is measured as the ratio of total trade 
(imports and exports) to GDP of that province. 
The share of state-owned economy (soe): In China’s particular economy structure, state-owned 
enterprises (SOE), which take up a large share of the economy, are quite different from private 
ones in many aspects. The most relevant one here is that SOEs have easier access to credit loans 
due to their close relationship with government. As is shown in Brandt et al. (2013), much of the 
decrease in TFP of China’s non-agricultural sector is attributed to the increasing misallocation of 
capital between state and non-state sectors. Therefore, we control for this effect by including “the 
share of state-owned economy”, which is calculated by the share of total assets owned by state-
owned enterprises at the provincial level. 
Foreign direct investment (fdi): As is discussed above in the theoretical framework, FDI will 




(Lashitew, 2012). Besides, FDI also serves as a signal of openness, indicating higher-quality 
institutions or a “wiser” government, which are beneficial for resource allocation. We measure 
FDI as the ratio of FDI to GDP at the province level. 
Another important explanatory variable is provincial government intervention (intervention), as a 
proxy for government intervention. Considering the overall difficulties in measuring government 
intervention and following Barro (1990), here we characterize the existence of government 
intervention in the economy with government consumption, net of spending on education, health 
care and social insurance. In particular, government intervention is measured as the ratio of 
government budget expenditure after deducting expenditure on health care, education and social 
to GDP at the province level,6 which is expected to be correlated with local governments’ 
behavior involving improper subsidies to firms, direct investment intending to boost the local 
economy, and perhaps with other activities fostering local protectionism, imposing interregional 
barrier, etc. Note the government intervention variable not only serve as control variables, but it 
is employed in additional interaction terms with the measures of fiscal decentralization to 
identify potential mechanisms that may moderate the effects of fiscal decentralization itself.  
To further characterize the degree of marketization, we also use the marketization index (denoted 
by market) compiled by Fan and Wang (2016), which includes 23 sub-indices, covering aspects 
such as the relationship between market and the government, the development of non-state 
economy, the development of production market, the development of production factor market 
                                               
6 In China, the government invests a large amount of money in infrastructure, but not all these are included in the 
government’s official budgets. Many of these investments are usually conducted by large state-owned enterprises. 
On the other hand, a good part of government expenditure is used to provide regular public goods and services, 
which should not be viewed as “interventions” in the local economy. Therefore, our measure excludes expenditure 
on the provision of health, education and social insurance services, the most common and important types of 




and the development of intermediary agency and legal system. The final marketization index is 
an arithmetic average of these 23 sub-indices. However, since the sub-indices have changed 
since the year of 2008, this index is available from 2008 to 2014. Therefore, when we include the 
market variable, the sample size would shrink substantially. 
To investigate the role of marketization or government intervention, we run the three following 
additional regressions: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
For model (4) and (5), the coefficient of first interest is 𝜆, which captures the potential role of 
government intervention (the degree of marketization) in the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and misallocation. For example, in equation (4) 𝛽 can be interpreted as the 
effect of fiscal decentralization on misallocation when the variable “government intervention” is 
0 and 𝜆 captures the moderation effect of government intervention. We expect 𝜆 in equation (4) 
to be significantly positive, implying that the impact of fiscal decentralization in reducing 
interregional resource misallocation will be reduced when government intervention is greater. In 
contrast, in equations (5), 𝜆 is expected to be statistically significant and negative, meaning that 
when market forces are driving the flow of capital, the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
reducing misallocation will be enhanced. 
As suggestive complementary evidence of the role of marketization, we also divide our full 
sample into two groups, eastern provinces and non-eastern provinces, and run regressions in 
these two subsamples separately. Eastern provinces include Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shandong and Guangdong, and the rest are non-eastern provinces. As is known, China’s 




than the inland provinces. It is then logical to suppose that eastern areas enjoy a higher degree of 
marketization than non-eastern ones. In fact, as can be seen in Table 1, eastern provinces trade 
more, enjoy more FDI inflows, have a smaller share of state-owned enterprises, and, of course, 
have a significantly higher marketization index. Combined with our earlier theoretical analysis, 
we expect that fiscal decentralization can significantly mitigate inter-municipal capital 
misallocation in eastern provinces relative to non-eastern provinces. 
Table 1. The Degree of Marketization: Eastern Provinces versus Non-Eastern Provinces 
Variable Eastern Provinces Non-eastern Provinces   
 Mean SD Mean SD Difference T-Stat 
trade 0.577 0.034 0.107 0.003 0.470 19.265*** 
fdi 0.567 0.029 0.188 0.006 0.379 16.969*** 
soe 0.314 0.013 0.591 0.009 -0.277 -17.102*** 
market 7.496 0.181 5.453 0.094 2.042 11.066*** 
Notes: For variables trade, fdi and soe, we have 112 observations in eastern province sample and 224 observations 
in non-eastern province sample. For the market variable, the corresponding sample sizes are 49 and 98, respectively. 
Data source is given in the next subsection. *** p<0.01. 
3.3. Data 
Because of several prominent reforms in China’s administrative regions prior to 2003,7 the panel 
data set covers 21 provinces in China between 2003 and 2018. As mentioned above, four direct-
controlled cities are excluded as are six provinces due to the lack of data. The data come from 
three different sources. First, city-level data on investment, GDP, fiscal revenue and fiscal 
expenditure are drawn from China City Statistics Yearbook. Second, provincial level data for 
measuring decentralization (provincial level fiscal revenue and expenditure) and data on other 
control variables such as government intervention, province-level GDP, finance development, 
trade and FDI are taken from the Statistics Yearbook for each province. Third, the labor share of 
                                               
7 In 2000, 21 regions were reformed to be prefecture-level cities and 2two county-level cities were upgraded to 
prefecture-level cities. In 2001, six regions were changed to prefecture-level cities and then in 2002, 10 more 




income used to calculate MPK and the control variable, share of state-owned enterprises are from 
the China Statistics Yearbook. The summary statistics of main variables are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Explanation Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
misall measured misallocation 336 0.207 0.073 0.022 0.455 
fdrev revenue decentralization 336 0.789 0.113 0.480 0.975 
fdexp expenditure decentralization 336 0.766 0.114 0.339 0.935 
lngdp log of provincial GDP per capita 336 10.217 0.697 8.212 11.654 
urban urbanization level 336 0.493 0.106 0.248 0.707 
secratio the share of secondary sector 336 0.482 0.059 0.246 0.615 
finance outstanding loan/GDP 336 0.961 0.301 0.354 2.243 
trade (export + import)/GDP 336 0.264 0.306 0.029 1.625 
soe the share of state-owned economy 336 0.499 0.192 0.140 0.850 
fdi foreign direct investment/GDP 336 0.314 0.263 0.061 1.326 
intervention (government expenditure-expenditure on health 
and education services)/ GDP 
336 0.119 0.043 0.056 0.286 
market the degree of marketization 147 6.134 1.427 3.380 9.950 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Baseline Results 
Table 3 reports the estimates based on model (3). All specifications control for province and year 
fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) report the results from OLS estimation while columns (3) and 
(4) are the results from IV regressions. Columns (1) and (3) present the results for revenue 
decentralization. Correspondingly, columns (2) and (4) are the results for expenditure 
decentralization. Overall, as shown in Table 3, the R-squared value is about 0.6 in IV regressions 
and the within R-squared is close to 0.3 when two-way fixed effects model is employed, 
indicating that our specifications have enough explanatory power on interregional misallocation.  
For our variable of interest, fdrev, revenue decentralization, the estimated coefficient in column 
(1) is negative but insignificant (the p-value is 0.29), thus, we find weak evidence that revenue 




expenditure decentralization to measure fiscal decentralization, displays similar results for fdexp, 
but the coefficient is more insignificant (the p-value is 0.520). This weak negative impact is not 
surprising since we have theoretically argued that there are both potential positive and negative 
effects of fiscal decentralization on misallocation. Also, we have argued that the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on misallocation depends on the role of government intervention or 
marketization, therefore these insignificant results might be a result of the heterogenous impact 
of decentralization. That is, the impact may be significant for provinces with higher degree of 
marketization but not for the provinces where government interventions are more pronounced, 
which we will discuss later. 
The insignificant estimates could also be due to the potential endogeneity issue. Endogeneity 
may arise because of the reverse causality problem; that is, upper-level governments (in our 
context, province-level governments) may adjust the assignment of revenues and expenditures 
among the various layers of governments within their boundaries trying to address a perceived 
severe interregional misallocation problem. Moreover, fiscal decentralization and interregional 
misallocation both can be determined by other external factors, such as geographic 
characteristics, cultural factors, or demographic composition. For example, a mountainous region 
could both exhibit a high degree of decentralization and a high level of interregional 
misallocation, both induced the high transportation and transaction costs.  
To deal with the potential endogeneity of fiscal decentralization, we need an instrumental 
variable. The instrumental variables for fiscal decentralization employed in prior studies usually 
include the initial value of decentralization, lagged independent variables and some type of 
geography variable (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017). However, as discussed earlier, a geography 




characteristics could also affect the level of misallocation, for example, through information, 
transportation or transaction costs channels, thus violating the exclusion restriction for IVs. The 
initial and lagged values of fiscal decentralization are also not likely to be suitable instruments. 
Therefore, we instrument for fiscal decentralization with the weighted average of fiscal 
decentralization from its neighbors. We instrument for fdrev with the product of inverse-distance 
matrix and fdrev while we instrument for fdexp with the product of contiguity matrix and fdexp 
because otherwise our instruments would suffer from weak instrument problem. The logic here is 
that subnational governments in China tend to interact with each other, especially with those 
geographically closer ones (Liu et al., 2017). Therefore, the province’s fiscal decentralization 
design tends to be related to its neighbors’ fiscal institution while the neighbors’ fiscal 
decentralization does not affect its own misallocation level.  
Columns (3) and (4) present similar results for IV estimation. Prior to discussing the coefficient 
on revenue and expenditure decentralization, we first take a look at the validity of the 
instruments. As we only have one instrumental variable in each regression, we need not to worry 
about the overidentification problem. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for the weak 
identification test is presented at the bottom of Table 3; it can be seen that all instruments are 
valid. As reported in column (3), the coefficient on revenue decentralization is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5-percent level, suggesting that an increase in revenue 
decentralization can significantly reduce the interregional misallocation level. Quantitatively, 
one standard variance deviation in revenue decentralization would lower misallocation by 0.84 
standard variance. However, the result displayed in column (4) suggests that expenditure 
decentralization still does not exert a significant impact on misallocation. These results together 




misallocation, while revenue decentralization tends to perform better than expenditure 
decentralization. 
The potential difference in the effects of revenue and expenditure decentralization on 
interregional capital misallocation could be explained by several mechanisms. First, Jin et al. 
(2005) argue that revenue decentralization generates strong incentives motivating local 
governments to seek the development of the non-state sector and reforms of the state-owned 
sector, among other things to allow them to increase budget revenues. On the other hand, 
expenditure decentralization does not generate such incentives (see Table 6 in Jin et al., 2005). 
Another possible explanation for the diverse results on revenue and expenditure decentralization 
is that allowing subnational governments to own more revenue can make the government more 
accountable and lead them to spend more wisely (Gadenne, 2017),8 which is consistent with a 
recent study by Jia et al.(2020) showing that vertical fiscal imbalances lead to subnational 
governments’ fiscal indiscipline. In addition, as discussed earlier in the theoretical framework, 
expenditure decentralization might also endow local governments with more capacity to 
implement intervention, such as to offer subsidies to attract firms and hence disturb the 
equilibrium price of capital. 
As for the controls, we find a positive relationship between urbanization and misallocation. The 
coefficient on urban is positive and statistically significant in all specifications except for 
column (3), implying that areas with a higher urbanization rate in China tend to have higher level 
of interregional misallocation. The reasons for this are not very clear to us. One possible 
explanation is that urban areas enjoy more capital inflows, including FDI, and that this may 
                                               
8 We realize that the accountability argument may have a reduced validity in China because of the absence of 




introduce a wider distribution of rates of return, including existing firms that may widen their 
presence and reinvest. The coefficient of trade, though being insignificant in column (3), is 
significant and negative in three specifications in Table 3, indicating that trade can increase 
capital allocation efficiency. This finding is quite intuitive and in line with previous studies on 
the relationship between trade and misallocation (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008). On the other 
hand, the coefficients on finance, fdi and soe are insignificant across all four specifications. Thus, 
we cannot determine the effect of these variables. The coefficients for government intervention 
are not robust or statistically significant across different specifications as well, despite the fact 
that the signs of the coefficients remain positive in all four regressions. 
Table 3. Baseline Results: The Effect of Revenue and Expenditure Decentralization on 
Misallocation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES misall misall misall misall 
 OLS IV 
fdrev -0.178  -0.542**  
 (0.165)  (0.270)  
fdexp  -0.180  0.155 
  (0.296)  (0.474) 
lngdp -0.103* -0.072 -0.095* -0.104 
 (0.054) (0.079) (0.052) (0.109) 
urban 0.485** 0.420* 0.574*** 0.460** 
 (0.177) (0.208) (0.188) (0.189) 
secratio   -0.153 -0.0221 
   (0.216) (0.177) 
finance -0.027 -0.038 -0.018 -0.024 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.034) 
trade -0.159* -0.147 -0.169** -0.154* 
 (0.079) (0.086) (0.079) (0.080) 
soe 0.181 0.242 0.0470 0.234 
 (0.150) (0.170) (0.165) (0.152) 
fdi -0.033 -0.030 -0.038 -0.036 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.033) 
intervention 0.270 0.353 0.213 0.189 
 (0.363) (0.405) (0.276) (0.450) 
Constant 1.059** 0.750 1.393*** 0.814 
 (0.490) (0.665) (0.527) (0.715) 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 336 336 336 336 
R-squared 0.299 0.292 0.560 0.574 




Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All the standard errors are clustered at the province level. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
4.2. Identifying the Role of Government Intervention 
Having established the relationship between decentralization and misallocation, we consider next 
whether this relationship varies when local governments adopt different strategies toward the 
private sector. More specifically, we attempt to answer the following questions: under what 
conditions can fiscal decentralization lower interregional misallocation levels and do local 
governments play a role here? As is discussed in the theoretical framework section, the overall 
effect of fiscal decentralization on interregional resource misallocation is uncertain, but when the 
market forces rather than government interventions are driving the flow of capital, we expect 
revenue decentralization to reduce misallocation. In order to address these questions, we estimate 
models (4) and (5) with OLS approach. The results are shown in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) 
show the results when the interaction term is between revenue fdrev and intervention, and 
columns (3) and (4) present the results when the marketization index (market) is used to 
construct the interaction term. 
Let us focus on column (1) first. When the interaction term between revenue decentralization, 
fdrev, and government intervention is included, the coefficient on revenue decentralization, 
which can be interpreted as the impact of revenue decentralization on misallocation when 
government intervention is 0, now becomes negative and statistically significant at the 5-percent 
level. Moreover, in comparison, the magnitude of the effect (-0.605) is much larger than that in 
the specification without incorporating the interaction term (-0.178 in column (1) of Table 3), 
indicating that revenue decentralization drives down interregional misallocation substantially 
when there exists no government intervention. Quantitatively, a one standard deviation increase 




deviation. On the other hand, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant at 
the 10-percent level. This means that when there is more government intervention, revenue 
decentralization actually tends to worsen interregional misallocation because revenue 
decentralization also endows subnational governments more capacity to implement interventions.  
In column (2), we use expenditure decentralization to measure decentralization. As can be seen, 
however, the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant. Furthermore, as a sharp contrast 
to the coefficient on fdrev in column (1), the coefficient on fdexp remains insignificant even 
when government intervention is absent, suggesting again that revenue decentralization can 
alleviate interregional capital misallocation while expenditure decentralization cannot. 
Complementarily, we also use market to characterize the degree of marketization (in other 
words, the absence of local protectionism) and hence to mirror the opposite side of government 
intervention and the corresponding results are presented in columns (3) and (4). As we discussed 
earlier, the sample size is now reduced to 147. As is shown in column (3), the coefficient on the 
interaction term between revenue decentralization and market is negative and significant at the 
10% level, indicating that the impact of revenue decentralization on lowering misallocation 
significantly rises when market forces tend to be driving the allocation of capital. However, the 
coefficient on revenue decentralization alone is positive and statistically significant. This would 
seem to suggest that when the degree of marketization is low, revenue decentralization would 
worsen interregional misallocation when the marketization is weak. Thus, we get confirmation 
that the government’s strategy toward the market economy is quite decisive. Column (4) gives 
the result for expenditure decentralization. Similar to the result in column (2), the coefficient on 
the interaction term between market and fdexp is insignificant, which indicates that increasing 




interregional misallocation. This is in line with the previous finding that revenue decentralizat ion 
performs better than expenditure decentralization in lowering misallocation. 
Table 4. The Role of Government Intervention and Marketization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES misall misall misall misall 
fdrev*intervention 3.275*    
 (1.695)    
fdexp*intervention  0.819   
  (1.951)   
fdrev*market   -0.105*  
   (0.052)  
fdexp*market    -0.080 
    (0.058) 
fdrev -0.602**  0.518*  
 (0.284)  (0.256)  
fdexp  -0.307  -0.083 
  (0.461)  (0.389) 
lngdp -0.077 -0.050 -0.086 0.020 
 (0.059) (0.086) (0.140) (0.139) 
secratio -0.129 -0.094 -0.340 -0.393 
 (0.181) (0.183) (0.319) (0.333) 
urban 0.442*** 0.412* 0.472 0.520 
 (0.154) (0.200) (0.474) (0.492) 
finance -0.043 -0.041 -0.027 -0.028 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.023) 
trade -0.140* -0.141 0.072 0.108 
 (0.075) (0.088) (0.101) (0.109) 
soe 0.220 0.239 0.491 0.582** 
 (0.128) (0.168) (0.323) (0.263) 
fdi -0.030 -0.033 0.133 0.196 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.185) (0.209) 
intervention -2.130* -0.239 0.722 1.164** 
 (1.178) (1.146) (0.615) (0.522) 
market   0.088* 0.072 
   (0.048) (0.052) 
Constant 1.206** 0.692 0.200 -0.542 
 (0.527) (0.720) (1.370) (1.294) 
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 336 336 147 147 
R-squared 0.313 0.294 0.303 0.363 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Considering the potential endogeneity, we also use IV approach to replicate the regressions in 
Table 4 and the obtained results are displayed in Table 5. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics to 
test the validity of the instruments are reported at the bottom of Table 5. As can be seen, all the 




in column (2). In column (1), the coefficient on the interaction term between fdrev and 
intervention is positive and only slightly significant with a p-value of 0.15. Similarly, the 
coefficient on fdrev is negative and slightly significant with a p-value of 0.13. Plus, the 
magnitude is much greater than that in column (3) Table 3, where no interaction term is included 
to control for the moderation effect of government intervention. Together, and given that our 
sample size is not large, these estimates provide weak evidence of the role of government 
intervention or marketization discussed earlier. In columns (3) and (4), we use marketization 
index to characterize the presence of market forces. As can be seen in column (3), when the 
interaction term is included, the coefficient on revenue decentralization is positive and 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that revenue decentralization may increase misallocation 
level when the variable market takes the value of 0. Also, the coefficient of the interaction term 
is negative, though being insignificant with a p-value of 0.147. The estimation result in column 
(4) offers a stronger evidence of the moderation effect: the coefficient on the interaction term 
between fdexp and market is negative and significant at the 5% level. In addition, the coefficient 
of fdexp is positive and significant, affirming again that fiscal decentralization leads to severer 




Table 5. The role of Government Intervention and Marketization: IV Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES misall misall misall misall 
fdrev*intervention 8.677    
 (6.023)    
fdexp*intervention  30.550   
  (26.730)   
fdrev*market   -0.162  
   (0.111)  
fdexp*market    -0.267*** 
    (0.103) 
fdrev -1.321  1.167*  
 (0.882)  (0.620)  
fdexp  -4.144  1.376** 
  (3.911)  (0.573) 
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 336 336 147 147 
R-squared 0.560 0.003 0.761 0.757 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 11.414 2.579 20.851 13.067 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We 
include the same control variables as in Table 4, which are omitted to save space. 
4.3. Subsample Regressions 
Since we only have data for marketization index after 2008, we would lose a large portion of 
information in our sample when the variable market is included. To offer complementary 
evidence of the moderation effect of the government’s strategy towards market, we further 
partition our full sample into two subsamples (eastern provinces with a higher degree of 
marketization and non-eastern provinces with a lower one) and then implement subsample 
regressions. The idea here is that we theoretically predict that fiscal decentralization would lower 
misallocation level more significantly where the market economy is more developed, which 
means that we expect that the estimates should be more significant for the eastern province 
sample. We admit that, however, eastern provinces and non-eastern provinces can be different in 
many ways, therefore it may be differences in other factors result in the diverse results. But since 
we focus on the coefficient of fiscal decentralization and theoretically no other factors have 




government intervention or marketization, subsample regressions should be able to provide 
suggestive additional evidence. 
The results obtained are reported in Table 6. Panel A displays the results from OLS estimation 
and Panel B reports the results from IV estimation. It can be seen that in columns(1) and (5), the 
coefficients are both negative and statistically significant at the 1-percent level while in columns 
(3) and (7) we get insignificant results, which suggests that our prediction is correct. In addition, 
the coefficients of expenditure decentralization are all insignificant in columns (2), (4) and (8), 
showing that revenue decentralization can alleviate misallocation while expenditure 
decentralization cannot. 
Table 6. The Role of Government Intervention and Marketization: Subsample Regressions 
Panel A 
OLS estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
misall misall misall misall 
 Eastern Provinces Non-eastern Provinces 
fdrev -0.684***  -0.162  
 (0.148)  (0.149)  
fdexp  -0.825  -0.253 
  (0.497)  (0.296) 
Panel B 
IV estimation 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
misall misall misall misall 
 Eastern Provinces Non-eastern Provinces 
fdrev -1.077***  -0.138  
 (0.168)  (0.264)  
fdexp  -0.965  0.368 
  (9.850)  (0.320) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 18.549 0.088 37.384 57.445 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We 
include the same control variables as in Table 3 and all the specifications include province and year fixed effects. 
The instrument variables used in Panel B are also the same as in Table 3. Note that in column (6) the instrument 
variable suffers from the weak instrument issue, so we may just ignore this specification. In fact, we have attempted 
to use other instruments instead, including the product of fdexp with the inverse distance matrix and the one-period 




5. Robustness Check  
5.1. Considering Neighborhood Effects with Spatial Autoregressive Model 
As is shown in Figure 1, one area’s capital misallocation level might be associated with one 
another in the “neighborhood”, suggesting the presence of spatial spillover effects. Therefore, we 
use here a spatial autoregressive model to account for the potential neighborhood effect. The 
corresponding results from spatial autoregressive estimation are displayed in Table 5. Panel A 
reports the results for full sample while panel B and panel C are the results for the eastern 
provinces subsample and non-eastern provinces subsample, respectively. The spatial weighting 
matrix used in the left two columns in each panel is the contiguity matrix, where only adjacent 
areas spill over to one another and the right two columns employee an inverse-distance spatial 
weighting matrix. Overall, we find no robustly significant evidence of the spillover effect, but it 
does exist in certain cases such as columns (7) and (8). 
In Panel A, we can clearly see that when using spatial autoregression method, the coefficient on 
fdrev is negative and significant at the 1% level, which indicates that revenue decentralization 
can alleviate interregional misallocation. Similarly, it can be seen that both revenue 
decentralization and expenditure decentralization can mitigate misallocation based on the results 
in columns (2), (3) and (4). Turning to the subsample regression results in panels B and C, we 
notice that all the coefficients on revenue and expenditure decentralization are significantly 
negative, with the magnitude of the mitigation effect being much greater in panel B than in panel 
C, which echoes our argument that decentralization can allay misallocation more significantly in 




Table 7. Spatial Autoregressive Estimation: The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization 
Spatial weighting matrix contiguity matrix Inverse-distance matrix 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Full sample misall misall misall misall 
Weighted Avg. of dependent variable 0.108 0.110 -0.324 -0.320 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.239) (0.240) 
fdrev -0.185***  -0.182***  
 (0.069)  (0.069)  
fdexp  -0.195*  -0.189* 
  (0.102)  (0.102) 
Observations 336 336 336 336 
Panel B (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Eastern Provinces misall misall misall misall 
Weighted Avg. of dependent variable -0.175 -0.193 -1.578*** -1.458*** 
 (0.255) (0.268) (0.583) (0.605) 
fdrev -0.685***  -0.667***  
 (0.121)  (0.114)  
fdexp  -0.838***  -0.801*** 
  (0.291)  (0.277) 
Observations 112 112 112 112 
Panel C (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Non-eastern Provinces misall misall misall misall 
Weighted Avg. of dependent variable 0.099 0.065 -0.436 -0.494 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.345) (0.347) 
fdrev -0.167**  -0.154*  
 (0.080)  (0.080)  
fdexp  -0.251**  -0.254** 
  (0.106)  (0.105) 
Observations 224 224 224 224 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the specifications include 
province fixed effects, year fixed effects and the same control variables as in the previous tables. 
We further consider the moderation effect of government invention on the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on misallocation by including the interaction terms in the spatial econometric 
model. Table 8 replicates the estimation in Table 4. In column (1) of panel A, the coefficient on 
the interaction term between revenue decentralization and government intervention is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. Meanwhile, the coefficient on revenue decentralization is 
significantly negative and the magnitude is much greater than that in column (1) Table 7, which 
is in line with our previous conclusion on the role of government. That is, when government 
intervention is absent, revenue decentralization can perform much better in mitigating 
misallocation. In addition, the result in column (3) conveys similar message. Columns (2) and (4) 




founded. We further us market to portray marketization in panel B. As can be seen, the results 
obtained are highly consistent with our identification of the moderation effect of marketization. 
Table 8. Spatial Autoregressive Estimation: The Role of Government Intervention 
Spatial weighting matrix contiguity matrix Inverse-distance matrix 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 misall misall misall misall 
Weighted Avg. of dependent variable 0.091 0.112 -0.375 -0.322 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.244) (0.240) 
fdrev*intervention 3.179**  3.444**  
 (1.402)  (1.395)  
fdexp*intervention  0.890  0.836 
  (1.470)  (1.464) 
fdrev -0.590***  -0.621***  
 (0.191)  (0.190)  
fdexp  -0.318  -0.304 
  (0.227)  (0.226) 
Observations 336 336 336 336 
Panel B (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 misall misall misall misall 
Weighted Avg. of dependent variable 0.362*** 0.309** -0.482 -0.512 
 (0.141) (0.144) (0.439) (0.440) 
fdrev*market -0.098**  -0.104**  
 (0.043)  (0.044)  
fdexp*market  -0.069  -0.083* 
  (0.048)  (0.048) 
fdrev 0.492*  0.511**  
 (0.240)  (0.246)  
fdexp  -0.107  -0.067 
  (0.262)  (0.265) 
Observations 147 147 147 147 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the specifications include 
province fixed effects, year fixed effects and the same control variables as in the previous tables. 
5.2. Alternative Measurement 
Despite the convincing evidence we have provided so far, we construct a new index to measure 
the level of inter-municipal misallocation as a robustness check. Bartelsman et al. (2013) use 
three moments of firm-level distributions to assess the impact of misallocation and find that the 
covariance term exhibits systematic variation in terms of both levels and changes, while the 
within-industry dispersion measurement is relatively stable. They conclude that the covariance 
term is a robust measure of misallocation, both theoretically and empirically. Following 




to achieve a better allocation of resources.9 Therefore, we compute our alternative measurement 
of interregional capital misallocation with the following formula: 
𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑙2𝑖,𝑡 = corr(𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑀𝑃𝐾𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (7) 
As before, i denotes province, t denotes year and j denotes the city in province i; and I represents 
fixed asset investment. Interregional misallocation is measured by the correlation between 
investment and MPK. The greater the correlation coefficient is, the more investment the 
productive regions receive, and the more effective the allocation of resources will be. Hence, in 
contrast to our earlier measure misall, this alternative measure, misall2 will be larger when 
interregional misallocation is lower and vice versa. The mean value of the measured misall2 is -
0.011 and its standard deviation is 0.413. 
Table 9 reports the estimation results when misall2 serves as the dependent variable. Columns 
(1) to (2) use the full sample to replicate the regressions in Table 3, estimating the effects of 
fiscal decentralization on interregional capital misallocation with the IV approach. As shown 
there, the coefficients on both revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization are 
insignificant. As we discussed earlier, this insignificant impact is not accidental since 
theoretically decentralization can both mollify and aggravate misallocation and the net effect 
counts on the relationship between the government and market. Therefore, we expect that 
decentralization can indeed reduce misallocation level in areas where the market economy is 
more developed. To test this prediction, we turn to the subsample regressions. In column (3), we 
find that the coefficient of revenue decentralization is positive and significant at the 10-percent 
level, which suggests that revenue decentralization can mitigate interregional misallocation in the 
                                               
9 The three measures in Bartelsman et al. (2013) are the within-industry standard deviations of labor productivity 
and of TFP and the correlation between firm size and the average product of labor based on the intuition that 




subsample of eastern provinces. However, the result for the less developed non-eastern provinces 
in column (5) is not significant. The contrasting results again support our hypothesis on the role 
of government or marketization in determining the effect of decentralization on misallocation. 
Table 9. Alternative Measurement of Interregional Capital Misallocation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES misall2 misall2 misall2 misall2 misall2 misall2 
 Full sample Eastern Provinces Non-eastern Provinces 
fdrev -0.626  3.657*  0.535  
 (1.350)  (2.227)  (1.446)  
fdexp  -2.708  -17.855  -1.568 
  (2.763)  (41.530)  (2.904) 
lngdp 0.210 0.620 0.010 1.887 -0.203 0.083 
 (0.651) (0.872) (0.419) (3.694) (0.893) (1.144) 
urban 0.118 -0.355 0.659 -4.159 1.630 1.624 
 (1.935) (1.772) (1.452) (6.150) (3.194) (3.086) 
secratio -0.868 -1.219 -4.312** -1.383 1.034 0.593 
 (1.326) (1.394) (1.697) (6.836) (1.238) (1.542) 
finance 0.436 0.309 -0.187 0.220 0.168 0.037 
 (0.267) (0.266) (0.178) (0.717) (0.346) (0.433) 
trade 0.070 0.167 -0.093 0.507 -1.657 -1.967 
 (0.280) (0.292) (0.338) (0.583) (1.777) (1.906) 
soe -1.542 -1.324 3.922** -0.610 -1.261 -1.499 
 (1.254) (1.207) (1.616) (4.724) (1.294) (1.311) 
fdi 0.165 0.197 0.586*** 0.026 0.529 0.683 
 (0.271) (0.276) (0.226) (0.665) (0.928) (0.923) 
intervention -2.979 -1.855 4.334 2.757 -1.080 -0.029 
 (2.008) (1.609) (6.581) (9.270) (3.264) (3.356) 
Constant -0.337 -2.293 -3.457 -1.665 1.239 0.584 
 (6.037) (6.102) (2.401) (4.716) (7.489) (8.104) 
Province fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 336 336 112 112 224 224 
R-squared 0.558 0.543 0.708 0.401 0.508 0.467 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 55.138 60.851 18.549 0.088 37.384 57.445 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the province level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As 
before, the instrument variable for expenditure decentralization for eastern province sample is weak, so we will not 
discuss the result in column (4). We also attempted to instrument for fdexp with other instruments or simply use 
OLS estimation in column (4), but no significant result is founded. 
Based on all the regression results from our empirical analysis, we arrive at the conclusion that 
fiscal decentralization can lower interregional capital misallocation while revenue 
decentralization performs better than expenditure decentralization in most cases, and that this 





Misallocation has become in the recent literature a prominent explanation for why poor countries 
or regions stay underdeveloped. That is, underdevelopment is as much a consequence of the 
misallocation of available resources as it may be a consequence of the shortage in the 
endowment of resources. This paper focuses on interregional capital misallocation in China and 
investigates the potential role played by fiscal decentralization on that misallocation. In 
particular, we study the effect of revenue and expenditure decentralization on intra-provincial 
and inter-municipal capital misallocation. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to 
study the impact of fiscal decentralization on (interregional) misallocation.  
We find that fiscal decentralization can mitigate interregional capital misallocation while 
revenue decentralization performs better than expenditure decentralization. We further identify 
that the attitude of local governments toward market intervention is a key intervening factor. 
Revenue decentralization can alleviate interregional misallocation when it is the market forces 
rather than government intervention that drives the flows of capital allocation. The results are 
robust to different specifications, IV estimation, subsample regressions, spatial autoregressive 
estimation and alternative measurement of interregional misallocation. 
Our conclusion on the role of marketization or degree of government intervention highlights the 
fundamental role played by market forces in attaining efficient resource allocation. Fiscal 
decentralization defines the relationship among various layers of governments while the degree 
of marketization or government intervention characterize the boundary between the government 
and market. Our findings suggest that while decentralization on its own does not secure better 
capital allocation, it can facilitate a more efficient resource allocation together with market forces 




resource allocation. In fact, China has experienced fiscal decentralization before its 
marketization reform, but its rapid growth did not start until the reforms and opening up policies 
implemented in the late 1980s. 
Our findings would suggest the importance of increasing revenue autonomy within the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization policy in China in order to improve interregional 
capital allocation. However, we also find that this beneficial effect depends on the presence of 
marketization forces and that contrary to a vision of a larger role of government in the economy, 
the larger presence of government intervention in the economy tends to dampen the positive 
impact of revenue decentralization on allocation.  
In terms of policy implications, our results strongly suggest that China should increase the 
degree of revenue decentralization. This is a strong policy implication especially given the fact 
that there is currently a high level of vertical imbalance in China, with subnational governments 
enjoying much more expenditure authority relative to revenue autonomy (Jia et al., 2020). Our 
results would also seem to indicate that interregional inequality in China might be due more to 
the misallocation of human capital, labor or technology rather than capital itself since the level of 
interregional capital misallocation decreases while interregional inequality level increases with 
higher levels of fiscal decentralization. Overall, the results are strongly suggestive, but of course, 
more evidence from other countries and regions will be required to reach a deeper understanding 
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